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Law on Love’s Stage:  





The Imaginative Power of a Renaissance Jurist 
 
When I was about to start writing on both law and love, there was 
reason to fear, I believe, that I had blindly engaged myself into a job 
twice as hard as usual, which, on top of it, was going to give the 
impression that I confessed something about my own way of life.1 
 
 The opening sentence of the preface to the treatise on Cupid the Jurist 
(Cupido Jurisperitus), published in 1553, leaves no doubt about the self-
conscious audacity of its author, the French humanist Étienne Forcadel 
(ca. 1519-1578) from Béziers.2 Given the controversial subject of his 
latest undertaking, Forcadel had obvious reasons, indeed, to suspect that 
the common opinion would take offence at it. Moreover, his project to 
put law on the stage of love could not be considered a sin of his youth 
anymore. By the time his Cupid the Jurist appeared, Forcadel had reached 
the age of 34 and churned out a series of books in which he had 
continuously explored the boundaries between magic, satire and legal 
argument.  
 In his Oracle of a Jurist or Dialogues on Occult Jurisprudence (Necyomantia 
iurisperiti sive de occulta jurisprudentia dialogi) of 1544, for example, Forcadel 
had staged a fictitious encounter between classical Roman jurists, famous 
representatives of the Medieval ius commune, and lawyers of his own time. 
                                        
* The author wishes to thank Drs. Ken Andries and the participants to the Fifteenth Euro-
pean Forum of Young Legal Historians for their comments on this paper during and after 
the session. 
1 Forcadel, Étienne (Latinized form: Forcatulus, Stephanus), Cupido iurisperitus, Lyon, apud 
Ioannem Tornaesium, 1553, preface: “Scripturo me de iure et amoribus, verendum, opinor, 
fuit ne vel onus duplex temere susciperem, vel de moribus meis quicquam viderer 
confiteri.” 
2 Scant bio-bibliographical details on Forcadel are contained in Géraldine Cazals’s 
contribution in: Arabeyre, Patrick - Halpérin, Jean-Louis - Krynen, Jacques (eds.), 
Dictionnaire historique des juristes français, XIIe-XXe siècle. Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 2007, pp. 337-338. 
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They discussed perennial legal issues against a magical background highly 
reminiscent of the fantastic setting of the witty dialogues written in 
Greek by the satirist Lucian of Samosata (ca. 125-180). Five years later, 
in 1549, he had produced another series of surrealistic dialogues 
describing the history of law in magical terms, the Legal Globe (Sphaera 
legalis), putting on stage different mythological figures and planets 
representing different stages in the development of Roman law. For 
example, whereas the harsh Law of the Twelve Tables was connected 
with the grim planet of Saturn, Jupiter was considered as the astrological 
proxy to the more mitigated law under the praetorians. The birth of 
Mars was seen as the origin of an epoch of endless disputes, which was 
not restored into peace until Justinian’s Digest came into being as a child 
of the Sun. In the meantime, Forcadel had also published a collection of 
poems in the vernacular, Le Chant des Seraines (1548). They often alluded 
to juridical themes, and were, allegedly, well-appreciated by Pierre de 
Ronsard (1524-1585).3 An updated version of his poetic experiments 
appeared in 1551 under the title Poésie.  
 Perhaps no one who had witnessed the early stages of Forcadel’s 
scholarly career would have expected these provocative eruptions of 
literary genius to occur one day, although his excellency in both classical 
and legal studies was clear from the beginning. Initially, Forcadel seemed 
to follow quite faithfully into the footsteps of the grave father of French 
humanism, Guillaume Budé (1468-1540). Although a man of letters 
himself, Budé was not really known for his taste of extravagant magical 
satire. Budé had foremostly promoted the study of law in its historical 
context by investigating the monetary and financial context of Roman 
case law in his De Asse.4 In the same vein, Forcadel’s first publication was 
a safely historical treatise, the Penus juris civilis (1542). It explored an 
important aspect of the material context in which Roman law had 
emerged. Taking title De penu legata (Dig. 33, 9) as a starting point, 
Forcadel discussed the food supply and the alimentation in Roman 
Antiquity on the basis of quotes from classical authors.  
                                        
3 Cf. Joukovsky, Françoise (ed.), Étienne Forcadel: Œuvres poétiques, opuscules, chants 
divers, encomies et élégies, Genève: Librairie Droz, 1977, p. 7. 
4 On the connection between Renaissance humanism and the historical study of law, see 
the classical article by Kelley, Donald R.: The Rise of Legal History in the Renaissance. In: 
History and Theory (1970) 9.2, pp. 174-194. 
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 A turning point in Forcadel’s life was 1557, when he became a 
professor of law at the then absolutely top university of Toulouse, 
leaving behind Jacques Cujas in the concours.5 The famous French 
historian of political thought, Pierre Mesnard, thinks that it is this happy 
and at the same time unhappy coincidence which might have contributed 
to the fact that Forcadel has largely fallen into oblivion. Although there 
are no traces of some kind of poisonous feud between Forcadel and 
Cujas themselves, the latter’s biographer, Jean Papire Masson (1544-
1611) was particulary scathing over Forcadel’s intellectual capacities to 
the greater glory of the genius of his demi-god.6 So, eventually, Forcadel 
paid a high price for having eclipsed the star of French humanism in this 
interminable concours which had started in 1554. History would now 
eclipse him in its turn.  
 Once he had landed his job in academia, Forcadel became more 
circumspect in choosing the themes of his writing. Altough he may have 
continued to write virtuoso prose and poetry, prudence undoubtedly 
summoned him to find an outlet for his literary genius in secret notes. 
After all, the folly of love poetry would have been difficult for the public 
to square with their image of a distinguished member of the Toulouse 
law faculty. Hence, Forcadel increasingly dedicated himself to the more 
ordinary albeit no less demanding business of writing purely historical or 
legal treatises, some of which were published by his son posthumously: a 
historical account of the institutions of Poland and France (Polonia foelix, 
1574; De Gallorum imperio et philosophia, 1579), studies on feudal law (De 
feudis, 1579), and on servitudes (De servitutibus, 1579). By the end of his 
life, he had even grasped the meaning of networking, at least if his eulogy 
of Henri de Montmorency-Damville (Montmorency gaulois, 1571) is 
anything to go by.  
 As he grew older, Forcadel obviously departed from the turbulent 
times in which he used to fuse the dizzy worlds of jurisprudence and 
literary magic into a foolish game of satire and play. Still, even if he 
ended up being a dim shadow of his literary self, he will undoubtedly 
                                        
5 The exciting intellectual climate at Toulouse throughout the 16th century is highlighted in 
several contributions assembled in Dauvois, Nathalie (ed.), L’humanisme à Toulouse (1480-
1596), Actes du colloque international de Toulouse, mai 2004, Colloques, congrès et conférences 
sur la Renaissance européenne 54, Paris: Honoré Champion Éditeur, 2006. 
6 See Mesnard, Pierre: Jean Bodin à Toulouse. In: Bibliothèque d’humanisme et renaissance (1950) 
12, pp. 44-51; Mesnard, Pierre: Un rival heureux de Cujas et de Jean Bodin: Étienne 
Forcadel. In: ZRG Rom. Abt. (1950) 67, pp. 440-441. 
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remain one of the most eminent prototypes of the Renaissance man. In a 
letter added as a “postface” to his Cupid the Jurist, Forcadel defended the 
idea of the giurista universale against specialist lawyers with a lack of 
culture and general interests:7 
 
It is entirely wrong to think that it is sufficient for a man with a truly 
human spirit to focus on just one trade. The Muses would consider that 
to be absolutely ridiculous. While playing the lyre with their fingers, their 
mind is performing arithmetic, their voices are singing and their feet 




 As pointed out above, Forcadel’s Cupid the Jurist (Cupido Jurisperitus) 
was the summit in the form of a novel of a couple of satirical dialogues 
in which he had already dealt with some of the most persistent problems 
of law since ancient times against a magical and mythological 
background. This time, his Lucian-like way of staging reality led him to 
embark upon an initiatic journey through the secret realm of the young 
boy of love, Cupid (also known as Amor), and his mother Venus. As 
regards the form of his novel, Forcadel seems to have drawn inspiration 
not only from Lucian of Samosata, but also from the highly influential, 
yet anonymous Hypnerotomachia Poliphili (1499), an allegoric love story in 
which the hero, Poliphilus, dreams about a quest for his beloved Polia. 
This adventure leads him along secret forests, beautiful valleys, fairylike 
gardens, curious inscriptions, architectural masterpieces and fantastic 
landscapes, much as is the case with the hero in Forcadel’s Cupid the 
Jurist.8  
 Forcadel’s alleged aim in Cupid the Jurist is to demonstrate to 
Hephaestion, a friend of his, that looking at law from the perspective of 
                                        
7 Forcadel (as in 1), p. 131: “Ne quis imposterum arbitretur hominis ingenui animum uni 
negotio obeundo duntaxat sufficere: quod quidem materiam ridendi praeberet musicis, qui 
dum testudinem digitis pulsant, mente numeros concipiunt, canunt interim, ac leniter 
terram pede certa lege quatiunt.” 
8 The hero of Cupid the Jurist is said to be a certain Callidemus; cf. Dauvois, Nathalie, Jura 
sanctissima fabulis et carminibus miscere. La concorde de la poésie et du droit dans quelques 
traités d’Étienne Forcadel: Necyomantia (1544), Sphaera legalis (1549), Cupido jurisperitus (1553). 
In Dauvois (ed.) (as in 5), p. 101. The identification of the addressee with Hephaestos 
seems to be rather unlikely (cf. below).  
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love and considering love from the perspective of law is a mutually 
beneficial experience. In the preface to Cupid the Jurist, Forcadel insists 
that love and law form a harmonious couple, since both of them 
promote concord and peace:9  
 
Until I will have revealed the essence of my advice, there is hope that 
love and law will be seen to be contained within the same frontiers, to 
the extent that both love and law lead mankind to concord.  
  
 This central message is also driven home through a somewhat 
surprising, yet remarkable formal procedure. In order to illustrate or to 
underscore interpretations of legal matters, Forcadel quotes poets and 
philosophers, while references to Roman and Canon law abound as 
testimonies to the events which occur in the love story. Through the 
very texture of his novel, then, Forcadel makes a wonderful attempt at 
illustrating the alleged compatibility of the logic of love and the logic of 
jurisprudence.  
 Yet the ultimate message Forcadel keeps in store for his reader turns 
out to be quite different. The end-effect of the hybrid texture of quotes 
taken from both literary and legal sources is to perplex and to amuse the 
reader.10 For example, it is rather uncommon in a novel to find a 4-page 
systematic list of references to all the passages taken from the Roman 
and the Canon law which are going to be interpreted in the course of the 
adventure story. The juxtaposition of a grave reference, say to Justinian’s 
Digest, in the middle of a narrative description of, say, desperate lovers, 
leaves the reader surprised and smiling.  
 Actually, instead of reading the initial statement about “concord” 
(concordia) as a uniform tribute to the exalted neo-Platonic philosophy of 
harmony and concord - as it is usually understood - it seems equally 
probable to think of Forcadel’s Cupid the Jurist as an incredibly intelligent 
satire on the disharmonious co-existence of love and law.  
 Should not the very fact that he provocatively conceives of 
Hephaestion as the addressee of his adventure story lead us to suspect 
                                        
9 Forcadel (as in 1), preface: “Donec ego consilii mei rationem detexero, spes est visum iri, 
amorem et ius, quo perducuntur homines ad concordiam, iisdem finibus contineri.” 
10 In order to convey a minimal sense of this technique, we have maintained the references 
to legal text from the Roman and the Canon law in their original form in this paper (cf. 
below). 
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right from the outset that the Realm of love is governed by a child-God 
who loves upsetting the good morals and legal foundations of society?11 
As is well-known, Hephaestion was the lover-boy of perhaps one of the 
most powerful homosexuals and adventurers the world has ever seen, 
Alexander the Great (356-323 B.C.). Along this line of interpretation, we 
might even wonder if the implied hero who narrates his journey through 
the realm of love in the first person singular could not be Alexander the 
Great, one of the greatest adventurers of all times?12 
 As it turns out, what Forcadel really shows in the course of Cupid the 
Jurist, is that the state of chaos usually associated with love is actually the 
common state of the law, while love turns out to be much more regular 
and rule-bound than the life of the law itself. A wonderful connection 
between love and law exists, then, precisely because the chaos of love is 
only apparent, whereas the apparent order of law rests on the 
contradiction and chaos usually associated with love. 
 
Lovely Playboy, Sweet Despot 
 
 The story of Forcadel’s adventure in the land of Cupid and Venus 
opens with an idyllic scene that reveals a paradise of harmony and 
concord. As he enters the gardens of the Realm of Love, Forcadel is 
enchanted by the variety of fine colored flowers, mellow fruit trees, and 
sweet-smelling perfumes that arouse his senses as the breeze blown by 
Favonius, God of winds, plays with his hair. But as a land of plenty 
similar to the mythical land of the Cyclopes rises in front of our hero, his 
blissful tranquillity is disturbed by a deadly serious reflection. Here 
comes the first paradox which crosses and troubles our jurist’s mind: For 
this prosperity in the mythic land of the Cyclopes to exist, what 
apparently mattered was to keep councils, assemblies, and lawmakers at 
bay – the very institutional mechanisms which humans employ all the 
time in an effort to attain precisely the state of plenty the Cyclopes 
                                        
11 See the apostrophe directed to Hephaestion in the opening sentence; cf. Forcadel (as in 
1), chapter 1, nr. 1, p. 9. 
12 To leave this interpretation open (since the ambiguous identity of the hero of his novel is 
undoubtedly part of the intellectual game Forcadel is typically playing with his reader), in 
what follows we will identify the first person recounting his journey through the realm of 
love with Forcadel. This is the safer option, since it can be deduced from “mihi iuris civilis 
studioso” in Cupido iurisperitus, chapter 1, nr. 1, p. 10 that the narrator is a legal scholar. We 
also learn that the narrator’s (fictitious) mistress is Clytia; see chapter 14, p. 74. 
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possessed. Mankind is on the wrong track. It is the absence of those 
institutions which is a sign of prosperity.13  
 Forcadel wonders, therefore, why he still finds that there are laws in 
the prosperous Realm of Love in the first place. In fact, it is precisely in 
the Realm of Love where you can find people most truly obedient to 
laws and rules – even if, at first sight, there seems to be no trace of a 
single law in the usual sense of the word, that is a law issued by a 
legislative assembly and which needs to be enforced through power. 
With a sense of irony, Forcadel quips that normally there should be no 
need of laws in a country with so harmless citizens, and, since the land is 
so rich, it must even be very fruitful for him as a legal scholar. 
 As Forcadel subsequently learns, the spontaneous observance of the 
law in the Realm of Love is actually a by-product of the tyrannical rule 
from which it suffers. Its terrific ruler is none other than Cupid himself, 
Amor, that mighty God of Heaven, Sea, and Underworld, that mighty 
conqueror of the entire pantheon and mankind, who from high in the 
sky rules the crowd of lovers and with a voice as clear as a bell orders 
those madmen each year on the last day of April to renew their loyalty to 
him on pain of grave punishment.14  
 Cupid’s despotically ruled empire, Forcadel muses, is simply unlimited 
in time and space. He quotes evidence from Hesiod (the first Greek epic 
poet), Parmenides (the philosopher who believed that nothing really 
changes), and, last but not least, the Roman law (the ultimate source of 
wisdom for lawyers). Even the famous Paragraph Ius naturale of Title De 
iustitia et iure (= Dig. 1, 1, 1)15 is adduced by Forcadel, indeed, to argue 
                                        
13 Forcadel (as in 1), chapter 1, num. 1, p. 10: “Nam ora ipsa coelo soloque iuxta felix 
Cyclopum agros mihi referebat, in quibus fructus, fruges etiam, sponte naturae ac sine 
cultura uberrime proveniunt. Unum illud interest, quod his ut Homerus ait, out’ agorai 
boulèphoroi oute themises, id est, neque conciones consiliariae sunt, neque leges. Atqui 
leges ipsae et legum disceptationes nusquam libentius audiuntur quam in hac regione, quae 
cum incolis admodum fructuosa sit, mihi quoque iuris civilis studioso non parum fructus et 
emolumenti attulit. Caeterum fuit quod mirarer leges ibi constitutas inveniri, ubi minimûm 
mali homines, legum severitate non egeant.” 
14 Forcadel, (as in 1), chapter 1, num. 1, p. 10: “Iubet Cupido, aethereus, marinus, 
plutonicus, deum atque hominum victor et triumphator semper Augustus, turbae 
populoque amantium uti adsint pridie Calendas Maias, et sacramento se quotquot sunt 
denuo adigant, foedusque recens feriant dominum salutari, ni male multari quisque 
maluerit.” 
15 As mentioned before, we have put the references to Roman and Canon legal texts in the 
main text so that the reader has the opportunity to experience the surprising and witty 
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that from times eternal, from the very beginnings of mankind, people 
have known how to make love and how to make sure that the species 
survives as a matter of natural law.16 In conclusion, the most absolute 
power in the world belongs to Cupid, as is further attested by Paragraph 
Illud, Title Quibus modis naturales filii efficiuntur legitimi (= Coll. 6, 1, 4 = 
Nov. 74, 4).17  
 Another illustration of Cupid’s extraordinarily extensive powers 
concerns his reign over the deceased. Contrary to ordinary rulers and 
governments, whose power is limited to living human beings, Cupid 
extends his jurisdiction far beyond death. Forcadel demonstrates this by 
quoting the following passages from Justinian’s Code and Novellae. The 
soul of a dead husband is said to be painfully afflicted and depressed by 
the second marriage of his wife in Paragraph Quae vero, Title De nuptiis (= 
Coll. 4, 1, 43 = Nov. 22, 43). Moreover, when a husband makes a legacy 
to his spouse on condition that the spouse does not enter into a new 
marriage, this condition is to be observed by the spouse on pain of 
nullity of the legacy, as is attested in Title De indicta viduitate (= C. 6, 40, 
2).  
 From the canon law, however, Forcadel infers that this clause is to be 
deemed invalid in legacies and last wills made to virgins. Stipulating such 
a harsh condition at the expense of a young lady who is not yet your 
lawful wife would be a great testimony to your angst and selfishness. It 
would also be highly disadvantageous to that girl, as Forcadel playfully 
suggests with an ironical reference to ecclesiastical authority, namely 
                                                                                                                   
effect brought about by the mere formal structure of Forcadel’s narrative. In addition, we 
give the modern version of these references, for which the following citations are used: 
Dig. 1, 1, 1, 1: Digesta Justiniani, Book 1, Title 1, Law 1, Paragraph 1 
C. 1, 1, 1: Codex Justiniani, Book 1, Title 1, Law 1 
Inst. 1, 1, 1: Institutiones Justiniani, Book 1, Title 1, Law 1 
Coll. 1, 2, 3: Novellae Justiniani, Collection 1, Title 1, Fragment 1 (I have added the modern 
equivalent to these Medieval citations from the Novellae) 
C. 1, q. 1, c. 1: Decretum Gratiani, Causa 1, Quaestio 1, Canon 1 
X. 1, 1, 1: Decretales Gregorii IX, Book 1, Title 1, Canon 1. 
16 Forcadel (as in 1), chapter 1, num. 2, pp. 10-11: “Amoris igitur imperium ubique 
latissimum est, et perantiquum: nam Hesiodus in Theogonia ex Chao simul cum terra 
genitum tradit, nec dissentit Parmenides. | Proinde ab initio ubi creati fuere homines, 
amare noverunt, et liberorum procreationi operam dare, l. 1, par. ius naturale, ff. de iustit. 
Et iure.” 
17 Forcadel (as in 1), chapter 1, num. 4, p. 11: “In summa, nihil est amore ipso 
vehementius.” 
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Canon Viduas, Paragraph Si virgines (= C. 27, q. 1, c. 8), since virgins 
esteem even higher those pleasures which they have not yet had the 
chance to experience […].18 According to Forcadel, the Gods therefore 
prefer virgins to widows, as is explained in Paragraph Optimum, Title De 
non eligendo secundo (Coll. 1, 2, 3 = Nov. 2, 3).  
 Forcadel also illustrates the eternal jurisdiction of Cupid over 
mankind, even over its heroes, by reference to Vergil’s story of Dido, 
Sichaeus and Aeneas. Sichaeus, Dido’s late husband, still welcomed her 
very heartily in the underworld after she had committed suicide for love 
of Aeneas. Again, one of the most sacred texts of law gives us a clue as 
to how late husbands get informed about the ongoing love stories of 
their former spouses. In Forcadel’s view, Canon Fatendum (= C. 13, q. 2, 
c. 29) indicates that the dead are informed about second marriages by the 
Angels and by those who die. Every time a new dead person enters the 
Underworld, he makes happy the anciens, who continuously suffer from 
never-ending boredom, with breaking news about the exciting world of 
the living. How, then, Forcadel wonders at the end of the first chapter of 
his Cupid the Jurist, could it be that the most frequent wish expressed 
amongst the subjects to Cupid’s jurisdiction is the desire to die for love: 
“Oh darling, I would die for you”? This is a pointless wish, since love 
cannot possibly be extinguished by death:19 
 
So to come back on what I said earlier, since love cannot even cease to 
live when lovers die, why, then, I beg you, is it that in love there is no 
more frequent wish than to die?  
 
 The universal order of passion and love transcends everything, and it 
is small wonder that Forcadel is dying of curiosity to find out more 
about the secrets of this fascinating Realm of Love. In the twenty-one 
chapters that follow, he seeks to share with us some of the most secret 
                                        
18 Forcadel (as in 1), chapter 1, num. 7, pp. 12-13: “At si testator nonnihil virgini reliquerit, 
ita ne nubat, voluntate nimium anxia et improba | nititur, de re nondum ad suam vel 
alterius iustam affectionem pertinente sollicitus. Praeterea in virgine durior est huiusmodi 
conditio, quae pluris eam voluptatem facit, quam nescit, can. Viduas, par. si virgines, 27, q. 
1. Proinde diis habetur virgo gratior quam quae vidua permanet, par. optimum de non elig. 
secund., col. 1.” 
19 Forcadel (as in 1), chapter 1, num. 8, p. 13: “Cum ergo (ut ad superiora regrediar) ne 
morte quidem ipsa, amor vivere desinat, cur, quaeso, fit ut in amore nullum votum morte 
sit frequentius?” 
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answers to some of the most profound questions that rattle the nerves of 
mankind and of jurists, in particular, since the origins of time: What are 
the signs and proofs of love? Are children the highest good and source 
of happiness for their parents? Why are the members of the female sex 
so much earlier mature than men? What is the normal duration for a 
pregnancy? Can partners who break up bring an action for deceit against 
their former lovers? Is it possible for lovers to survive if they have no 
money? Is marriage the best type of relationship? What is the power of 
music in the seduction of women? Are good looks decisive for 
attraction? In what follows a short impression is given of the manner in 
which Forcadel treats of this kind of themes through the example of his 
story about the relationship between contracts and love. 
 
Passionate about Contracts 
 
 From his trip to the gardens of Love in the first chapter, Forcadel 
moves on to the midst of a dark and sacred forest in the second chapter. 
There he hears lovers crying and moaning with pain and pleasure at the 
same time: “ô eia, eia mala ô”. This, he says, is the fate of lovers, some 
praising the sublime beauty of their sweetheart, some decrying her 
inconstancy and unfaithfulness.20 As Roman law has it, indeed, more 
precisely in Law Inter, Title De usu fructu (= C. 3, 33, 15) the life of man is 
exposed to thousands of shocks and vicissitudes. Yet lovers suffer from 
the most precarious condition, since the female sex is notably prone to 
change and inconstancy, as is attested by Canon Forus de verborum 
significatione (= X. 5, 40, 10).  
 Forcadel is puzzled at the pitiful sight of these broken relationships. 
As a committed jurist and Christian he can not believe his eyes. For did 
not God reveal himself as the God of Love in the Bible? Does not the 
law of the Church, notably in Canon Iuramenti (= C. 22, q. 5, c. 12), 
affirm that God esteems a naked promise as highly as an oath? Did not 
pagan philosophers in Antiquity hold that trust and fidelity are the 
cornerstones of society, as Roman law confirms in Title De pactis (= Dig. 
2, 14, 1).21 Why, then, do lovers break up and make up all the time?  
                                        
20 Forcadel (as in 1), chapter 2, num. 1, pp. 13-14: “Haec erat sors amantibus aptissima, 
quorum alii puellae praeclaram faciem, alii insignem perfidiam per tumultum decantabant et 
inconstantiam subinde arguentes |  vociferabantur.” 
21 Forcadel (as in 1), chapter 2, num. 1, p. 14: “Debuerunt saltem hae conversiones rerum 
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 Shall not love affairs be considered as contracts, in which mutual 
consent is sufficient to produce a real, continous and enforceable 
obligation? Is not this expressed in Law Sufficit, Title De sponsalibus (= 
Dig. 23, 1, 4) and Law Mulierem, Title De ritu nuptiarum (= Dig. 23, 2, 5)? 
Alluding to an age-old debate about the possiblity of concluding 
contracts at a distance, Forcadel states that love can be concluded from a 
distance, as long as the declaration of will is transmitted to the other 
party or lover by means of a messenger or a letter. Apparently, the 
Roman poet Propertius had deplored the loss of his writing tablets – a 
topic among the poets in Antiquity – precisely because they were capable 
of transmitting messages to his mistress as persuasively as the lover 
himself: “from now on these tablets are able to placate girls without me; 
and wihout me some speak very eloquently”.22 Could this have meant, 
perhaps, that, tragically, some young ladies eventually even preferred the 
love letters to the lover himself? 
 What we get in the second chapter of Forcadel’s Cupid the jurist, then, 
is a witty parody on one of the most crucial developments in the history 
of contract law, namely the development from the traditionally Roman, 
closed system of contracts, involving many formalities, towards a 
general, open category of contracts based on mutual consent.23 As a rule, 
stipulations and real contracts could not be concluded unless the 
contracting parties were in the same place at the same time. This was a 
crucial evolution, already reflected in 14th century Castilian law, which 
was further developed on the basis in canon and natural law. It became 
mainstream contract theory in the scholastic tradition, but it still formed 
the subject of fierce debates amongst the humanist jurists of 16th century 
                                                                                                                   
in amore propter perfidiam quiescere, cum Amor Deus sit, et Dii nudam promissionem 
tanti faciant quanti iusiurandum (…) Deinde cum amor a iure naturae omnibus insitus sit, 
ut paulo ante dixi, humanae fidei nihil magis congruit quam pacta servare (…) Amor enim 
ut pactum in duorum consensu versatur, eumque tantum desiderat (…).” 
22 Propertius, Elegiae, 23, 3, v. 5-6 “Illae iam sine me norant placare puellas, et quaedam sine 
me verba diserta loqui”. 
23 See, for instance, Barton, John (ed.): Towards a general law of contract, Comparative studies 
in continental and Anglo-American legal history, 8. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1990; 
Birocchi, Italo: Causa e categoria generale del contratto. Un problema dogmatico nella cultura privatistica 
dell’età moderna. I. Il cinquecento, Il Diritto nella Storia, 5. Torino: Giappichelli, 1997. Duve, 
Thomas, “Kanonisches Recht und die Ausbildung allgemeiner Vertragslehren in der 
Spanischen Spätscholastik.” In: Condorelli, Orazio – Roumy, Franck – Schmoeckel, 
Mathias (eds.): Der Einfluss der Kanonistik auf die Europäische Rechtskultur, Band 1: Zivil- und 
Zivilprozessrecht, Norm und Struktur, 37, 1. Köln-Weimar-Wien: Böhlau, 2009, pp. 389-408. 
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France, precisely because a general law of contract did not correspond to 
the original Roman law of contract (which the humanists sought to 
recover).  
 With an amusing sense of humor, Forcadel puts these serious and 
complex juridical debates on contract law into perspective by putting 
them against the background of his adventure story in the Realm of 
Love – the ultimate reality, and a reality which Forcadel does not seem to 
consider as wholly harmonious and peaceful. After all, the basis of life, 
Love, is chaos, disruption and war.  
 Hence we find Forcadel wondering whether the Latin word for 
contract or agreement (pactum) is etymologically derived from the Latin 
word for peace (pax), or conversely. In other words, he wonders whether 
agreement is a consequence of peace or rather a condition for the 
establishment of peace? In the canon law tradition, particularly Canon 
Pactum, Title De verborum significatione (= X. 5, 40, 11) a text of Isidor of 
Seville (ca. 560-636) was cited, to the effect that peace (pax) precedes 
agreement (pactum, pactio), since peace is a condition for agreement.24 
Forcadel points out that on this account it is perfectly possible to explain 
why love affairs fall apart so quickly.  
 Lovers break up as soon as the peace on which their “love agreement” 
was built is disturbed, but then they make up again as soon as peace is 
restored, only for their relationship to break up again. Quite cynically, 
Forcadel thinks Isidor’s is a sound etymology, precisely because it helps 
to explain the reality of the continuous making and breaking of love 
affairs.25 As the Latin poet Publilius Syrus (1st century B.C.) noted: 
“concord is appreciated all the more after a period of discord”.26 So 
there is nothing strange about the big number of shattered love affairs.  
 However, against this line of thought, identified with the canon legal 
tradition, Forcadel puts the contrary interpretation which is ascribed to 
Ulpian. The Roman jurist Ulpian indicated that agreement (pactum, pactio) 
is derived from peace (pax) in Dig. 2, 14, 1. Agreement (pactum) is 
precisely the instrument through which the transition from war to peace 
                                        
24 Isidor of Seville, Etymologiae (ed. Lindsay), book 5, chapter 24, num. 18: “Pactum dicitur 
inter partes ex pace conveniens scriptura, legibus ac moribus conprobata.”  
25 Forcadel (as in 1), chapter 2, num. 7, p. 16: “Pactum a pace deduxit Isidorius (…) ne 
mirum sit pacta amantium non servari, cum pax eorum parvo duret tempore, vigent bella, 
et quaedam induciae, mox utcunque redeunt in gratiam (…).” 
26 Publilius Syrus, Sententiae (ed. Friedrich), p. 38: “Discordia fit carior concordia.”   
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(pax) is brought about.27 So the word “agreement” (pactum) must logically 
preceed the word for peace (pax). This realistic approach is reiterated in 
Law Conventionum, in Title De pactis (= Dig. 2, 14, 5). What Forcadel is 
doing here, of course, is poking fun at the usual, pretty much Stoic 
procedure jurists of his time used to try and find the right interpretation 
of words, while at the same time raising the fundamental question of 
whether law, and contracts and treaties in particular, are a precondition 
for order and peace, or conversely? Of course, arguments can be raised 
in favor of both opinions. This is simply a chicken-and-egg problem.  
 Forcadel brings his ironic discussion of love as a contract to a head 
when he integrates the whole Roman discussion about nominate versus 
innominate contracts into his analysis of love. In Roman law, nominate 
contracts were recognized as having their own name, and therefore being 
enforceable through actions specific to that contract, whereas 
innominate contracts were thought to be merely “naked” pacts and 
hence unenforceable in court.  
 By the time Forcadel wrote his treatise, this Roman distinction had 
been superseded by the idea, derived from canon law, that every promise 
is binding (X. 1, 35, 1: pacta quantumcumque nuda sunt servanda) and that the 
fidelity to the given word is the highest good. Forcadel actually cites 
Roman texts in order to argue that this was also the original view of the 
Romans (Dig. 50, 17, 84 and C. 4, 18, 1). This was a procedure often 
employed by the scholars of Roman law in order to save the face of 
Roman law in light of the dominant norms and values of an almost 
uniformely Christian society.28  
 As Forcadel wisely points out, the Romans soon found out that shame 
was not sufficiently present in most human beings in order to prevent 
them from becoming unfaithful to their promises.29 That explains why, 
                                        
27 Forcadel (as in 1), chapter 2, num. 7, p. 16: “Sane Ulpianus maluit a pactione pacem 
deducere (…) Pactum, inquit, a pactione dicitur, unde et pacis nomen appellatum est. Nisi 
sic intelligas, pactum esse appellatum nomen pacis, id est, nomen ad pacem faciens, sive 
pacificum, quia pacto et foedere saepissime a bello disceditur.” 
28 Cf. Dolezalek, Gero, “The Moral Theologian’s Doctrine of Restitution and its Juridifica-
tion in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries”. In: Bennett et al. (ed.), Acta Juridica. Es-
says in Honour of Wouter de Vos. Cape Town-Wetton-Johannesburg: Juta, 1992, pp. 104-107. 
29 Forcadel (as in 1), chapter 3, num. 1, p. 19: “Sed perfidi pudor tantummodo onerabatur, 
quae vero remedia promissum servare cogerent, nondum ipsi legumlatores induxerant, qui 
tandem indignati ob multorum singularem impudentiam et perfidiam, actiones 
composuere, per quas promissor stare pacto adigeretur (…) quia nemini sibi ius dicere 
licuit, aut in iudicium venire sine actione (…).” 
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eventually, the Roman law became different from the principles 
expressed in the canon law and prescribed by the law of nations. In 
granting actions to the victims of breach of contract, the Romans wanted 
to prevent people from taking the law into their own hands, Forcadel 
argues. This might sound a little bit anachronistic. Even if, obviously, 
there is evidence that the Romans disliked self-justice (Dig. 4, 2, 13; Dig. 
3, 5, 5, 2), the increasing monopolization of dispute resolution by the 
State is a phenomenon pretty much typical of Forcadel’s own time and 
the modern period in general.  
 In Forcadel’s view, the Romans finally decided to attach procedural 
actions only to the most frequent contracts, say sale-purchase. But to this 
list of enforceable contracts, the French humanist from Béziers now 
adds… love:30 
 
There is a grave and useful debate going on about whether a love affair 
(amor) must be classified among the nominate contracts or not. I 
certainly call it a contract, since a mutual obligation exists from the 
moment of its inception. It is also allowed for scholars to call it a 
nominate contract, since it has the most elegant name one could desire 
to have, as is clear from Law Iurisgentium, Title De pactis (= Dig. 2, 14, 7). 
Would not all people wish to distinguish love from the general concepts 
“agreement” or “contract”? What is more, love should with reason be 
considered as the most excellent of agreements. It should be given its 
own action for enforcement and its own name. 
  
 A love affair, then, is a nominate contract which can be enforced in 
court. Typical of Forcadel, however, is that he ridicules the deadly 
serious discussion about nominate versus innominate contracts by asking 
the following questions: How do we need to classify contracts for paid 
love? Are love affairs involving payment, namely prostitution, also 
worthy of a name? Is paid love enforceable before the courts? 
Apparently, there was a most learned dispute going on about this 
                                        
30 Forcadel (as in 1), chapter 3, num. 1, p. 19: “Gravis et utilis est illa contentio, cum 
dubitatur, utrum amoris contractus nomen suum habentibus inseri debeat an non. 
Contractum appello, quia ultro citroque obligat, cum vere initus est. Et doctoribus 
nominatum dicere licebit, cum tam elegans nomen habeat, quam quod maxime desiderari 
potest, l. iurisgentium, ff. de pact. Nam quotusquisque amorem a generali conventionis vel 
contractus nomine non separaverit? Quinetiam conventionum excellentissima merito 
haberi debet, et actione sua non minus quam nomine donari.” 
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question. Yet, as decent French manners demand, Forcadel rejects the 
objectionable idea that paid love could ever be worthy of a name.31 Paid 
love is simply an innominate contract. It is a contract of the type “I do 
something for you so that you give me something in return” (facio ut des) 
or “I give you something so that you do something for me in return” (do 
ut facias) in particular. A contract for paid love has no specific actions 
named after it, although the actio praescriptis verbis and the actio de dolo can 
be used to enforce or dissolve it.  
 
Wickedly in love 
 
 From a discussion of the law of contract we move to a discussion of 
criminal law in chapter four of Cupid the Jurist. Finding himself in the 
midst of a vast forest, Forcadel suddenly notices Sylvanus, the mythic 
guardian of sacred woods. As it turns out, he has been employed by 
Cupid as Chief of Police in the forests of the Realm of Love. Forcadel 
listens as Sylvanus prays to the Godess of Witchcraft, Hecate. 
Apparently, the Chief of Police is asking her to bewitch a young girl and 
make her fall in love with him. Sylvanus’ love-sickness leads Forcadel 
into a reflection on the devastatingly poisonous nature of Cupid’s 
power:32 
 
Is there anything capable of escaping from under love’s coercive spell? 
Love orders you to break the law. Particularly, love urges you to break 
those laws, prescribed already in ancient times, which forbid you to use 
love potions, lest sorcery and black magic increase the libido of chaste 
souls, thereby leading them astray.  
 
 Forcadel adduces the usual amount of citations from the Roman law 
(e.g. C. 9, 18, 4; Dig. 48, 8, 3; Dig.  48, 19, 38, 5) to substantiate his point 
about the criminal nature of love potion abuse. Referring to Paragraph 
                                        
31 Forcadel (as in 1), chapter 3, num. 5, p. 21: “Non ero nimius in recensendis aut 
refellendis duarum factionum opinionibus (…) Nam altera interpretum pars multum 
ineptiarum, altera parum iudicii coniecit et habuit. Itaque perpetuum hoc esse volo in 
omnibus innominatis contractibus, ut tam praescriptis verbis actio quam de dolo dari 
possit, si dolus aliquis arguatur, modo de dolo agere malim (…).” 
32 Forcadel (as in 1), chapter 4, num. 1, p. 24: “Quid non cogit amor? Leges certe violari 
iubet, quae vetant ne pudici animi philtris vel incantationibus ad libidinem deflectantur 
(…).” 
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Novimus, Title Quibus modis naturales filii efficiuntur legitimi (= Coll. 6, 1, 4 = 
Nov. 74, 4) he concludes that, in fact, love is pure madness (amor furor 
merus).33 This explains, according to Forcadel, why in Title De 
successionibus sublatis (= Inst. 3, 12) the term “bacchari” is used to denote 
the behavior of a women who has fallen in love with a slave. Women in 
love behave as insanely as the Maenads, the drunken, female followers of 
Bacchus, the ancient God of wine and ecstasy. Moreover, Paragraph 
Apud of Title De aedilitio edicto (= Dig. 21, 1, 1, 9) indicates that 
“bacchari” is to be derived of your senses and is to suffer from a vice as 
pernicious to the soul as fever is to the body.  
 In short, Forcadel admits:34 
 
I could no longer control myself. I could no longer restrain myself from 
taking the audacious step to take Cupid to court, since he lies at the basis 
of a big number of grave crimes. It is a case which does not require long-
drawn-out testimonies. The story of Myrrha is telling enough. Under 
Cupid’s influence, Myrrha (called Smyrna by Hyginius35) desired to sleep 
with her father Cinyras, the king of the Assyrians. Against all good 
morals and laws, as is obvious from Law Nuptiae and Law Quinetiam in 
Title De ritu nuptiarum (= Dig. 23, 2, 53 and 55) she finally had 
intercourse with him in an act of utter turpitude while he was drunk and 
ignorant. 
                                        
33 Cf. Nov. 74, 4 (ed. Schoell-Kroll): “Novimus etenim et castitatis sumus amatores et haec 
nostris sancimus subiectis: sed nihil est furore amatoris vehementius, quem retinere phi-
losophiae est perfectae, monentis et insilientem atque inhaerentem concupiscentiam re-
frenantis.” 
34 Forcadel (as in 1), chapter 4, num. 5, p. 25: “Non potui tunc mihi temperare, quin 
Amorem audacter accusarem, velut causam multorum magnorumque scelerum. Res non 
eget prolixis testimoniis praesertim cum illo suadente Myrrha (quam Smyrnam vocat 
Hyginius) Cinyrae Assyriorum regis filia patris concubitum appetierit, et eo tandem 
temulento ac ignorante contra fas et leges turpissima potita sit (…).” 
35 Caius Julius Hygin(i)us (ca. 64 B.C. - 17 A.D.) wrote a book on fables (Fabularum liber) 
containing a summary of the most important myths used in Greek and Latin poetry. It was 
succesful among Renaissance humanists as a key to reading the classical authors. Hyginus 
recounts how Smyrna was punished by Venus on account of the irreverential feelings of 
her mother Cenchreis. She had deared to say that her daughter was more beautiful than 
Venus; cf. Fabularum liber, Basle, apud Ioannem Hervagium, 1549, Fabula 58, p. 15. To 
show off his erudition and antiquarian curiosities typical of most Renaissance humanists, 
certainly in 16th century France, Forcadel elaborates on the origins of this confusion of the 
names Smyrna and Myrrha in the text that followes the quote which we have translated 
above. 
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 There is absolute proof that Cupid is the cause of thousands of 
crimes, so he must be punished, according to Forcadel. If people 
burning cities are sentenced to death by burning, as is evident in Law 
Capitalium, Paragraph Incendiarii, Title De poenis (= Dig. 48, 19, 28, 12); if 
Phaëthon died because he mistakenly set the sky on fire when he wished 
to take over the reins of the Sun from his father Helios; then why does 
Cupid go free? He sets on fire heaven, earth and seas all the time. Worse 
still, he is a most unfair judge, since he strikes lovers with absolute 
blindness, which is contrary to the procedure prescribed in Law Sancimus 
(C. 9, 47, 22)?36 What is more, as Forcadel points out in chapter 17, 
should we not question the legitimacy of Cupid as a jurist and judge in 
the first place?37 Can it be allowed for an ever-juvenile playboy to 
become a judge? Did he take a law degree? Does he have legal capacity, 
in the first place, given his juvenile age? 
 Forcadel’s fictitious accusation of Cupid is a witty illustration of the 
impotency and powerlessness of the human legal system in the face of 
that eternal God of potency. Ironically, Cupid does not even fulfill any 
of the conditions required in civilized societies for occupying a powerful 
position within the legal system. Cupid reigns as an absolute despot. 
Through an entirely unwholesome joint venture with his mother Venus, 
he rules everything. What beats the limit is that Cupid does not even 
need coercion in order to enforce his power. There is a law of love 
which imposes itself on human beings automatically, without the 
slightest need for coercion. Cupid detains a power politicians and judges 
in the real world can only dream of. In fact, he rules over all secular 
rulers, and is therefore to be called the second Lord of the World.38 His 
jurisdiction is parallel to that of secular empires. Worse still, Cupid 
constantly intrudes into those jurisdictions and upsets their patterns.  
 Tragically, Forcadel’s journey to the Realm of Love seems to suggest 
that the collective potency of judges, legislators and the whole fabric of 
our legal hierarchy do not come close to half of Cupid’s power, even if it 
got a collective boost of Viagra. During a conversation with Cupid’s 
                                        
36 Forcadel (as in 1), chapter 4, num. 6, p. 26: “Quid obest quominus Amor puniatur, qui 
coelum terras et maria pergit accendere? Potissimum cum ipse iudex adeo iniquus sit, ut 
oculis delinquentibus cor affligat, adversus l. sancimus, C. de poen.” 
37 Forcadel (as in 1), chapter 17, num. 6, pp. 92-93. 
38 Forcadel (as in 1), chapter 9, num. 2, p. 48: “Quod si Cupidinem ad reliquos principes 
referas, quos omnes ad unum superavit, mundi secundus dominus iure optimo dicendus 
est. Nam si potior mundi principibus est, mundum ut sibi asserat necesse est.” 
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mother Venus, she confesses to Forcadel, not without a certain self-
esteem, that even the divine power of our Holy Father, the Pope, is 
largely inferior to that of her playboy son.39 Whether she was thinking of 
the number of love affairs in which she had seen certain Popes indulge, 
or rather of the sex scandals that infected the clergy every now and then, 
is unsure. Yet Cupid’s omnipresent hold over society, and divine as well 
as secular jurisdictions, in particular, seems to be beyond any doubt. That 
is way Cupid deserves severe punishment. He is a false jurist. He is a 
ruthless judge. He is nothing but a silly playboy. In the name of law, 
Forcadel vindicates the rights of the true jurists. Yet he keeps on smiling 
regardless. 
 
A Human(ist) Comedy? 
 
 Put on the stage of love, law reveals its weakness, frailty and fragility. 
In Forcadel’s view, the legal order of society is under constant pressure 
of a God of Love who seems to proceed in more regular patterns than 
law itself. Contrary to his initial statement, which was aimed at reassuring 
his readership, the relationship between law and love as it is described in 
his novel turns out to be anything but harmonious. The dynamic of this 
odd couple appears to correspond to Heraclitus’ restless unity of the 
opposites instead of Plato’s blissful idea of concord.40 
 The final verses of Forcadel’s Cupid the Jurist are telling in this respect. 
Incidentally, they are composed in the form of an elegiac distich, which 
as a matter of course recalls the priceless Latin love poetry of Catullus, 
Properce and Ovid. At the same time, the elegiac distich transmits these 
very Roman poets’ sense for novelty, provocation, and controversy. In 
poetic terms, Forcadel mocks even at his own, prosaic enterprise. 
                                        
39 Forcadel (as in 1), chapter 9, num. 2, pp. 49-50: “Quid si committantur ille et hic, 
singulari certamine? An neuter vincet alterum? Vereor ne Cupido sit superior. Nam quo 
suam potestatem summam esse prae caeteris ostendat Pontifex, omnes reges Lunae 
confert, se unum Soli, cap. Solitae de maior. et obedi. Atqui Solem ab Amore victum, cum 
multis eventibus, tum a Daphne fugitiva probari et argui potest.” 
40 Interestingly, one of Forcadel’s poems (Le pleur d’Héraclite et le ris de Démocrite, philosophes) 
expresses both the melancholy with which Heraclitus was struck on account of his impious 
philosophy, and the excessive mockery displayed by Democritus for the same reason; this 
opusculum is contained in Joukovsky’s edition (as in 4), pp. 127-137.  
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Tongue in cheek, he finishes his novel by putting his literary effort into a 
laughable perspective:41  
 
When He saw that laws were being mixed with the tenderness of love,  
He burst out laughing,  
Cupid, that playboy Who is bound by no law. 
 
 Forcadel, then, seems to have been capable of smiling at the insight 
that his fate was no less subject to the vicissitudes of Cupid’s frivolous 
laws than the legally ordered society. Self-conscious and humble at the 
same time, Forcadel indulged in the sight of both his and society’s 
pointless struggle under the sun. True, to the extent that love and law 
both further concord, they seem to be partners in the same country. But, 
as is obvious from Cupid the Jurist, their interplay produces rather 
discordant sounds. 
 Contrary to what posterity and Forcadel’s contemporaries believed 
they needed to infer from this provocative book on love and law, the 
French humanist teaching at Toulouse strongly denied that he had 
stepped out of his role as an established legal authority. For one thing, 
Forcadel tried to defend his cause by implicitly recognizing a right to 
provoke (ius provocationis) to all men of virtue and experience.42 More 
important, however, is the apologetic letter addressed to his calumniators 
(Epistola ad calumniatores) and added to his Cupid the Jurist. In this letter, 
Forcadel found it as hard to hide his self-esteem and to denounce the 
envy (invidia) of his colleagues as in the preface to his book. This was not 
entirely uncommon among the humanists, who frequently displayed an 
innate tendency to loathe conformist academic thought.  
 In the preface, Forcadel had compared his fate with that of God the 
Creator: by his very act of Creation, God had also allowed his enemies, 
the atheists such as Epicurus, to come into existence.43 By the same 
token, Forcadel faced the prospect of feeding his very enemies and 
envious hairsplitters with his publications. In the apology, Forcadel 
                                        
41 Forcadel (as in 1), p. 124, in fine: “Legibus ut teneros misceri vidit amores / risit, qui 
nulla lege tenetur Amor.” 
42 Forcadel (as in 1), preface: “Verum si ad peritos et bonos viros ius provocandi fuerit, si 
iudicium suum tantisper sustineant, donec ego consilii mei rationem detexero, spes est 
visum iri, amorem et ius, quo perducuntur homines ad concordiam, iisdem finibus 
contineri.” 
43 Forcadel (as in 1), preface. 
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raised himself to the same status as the honest and honourable lawyers, 
leaders and philosophers, ranging from Solon to Ulpian and Cicero, who 
had served the law and worshipped the Muses simultaneously. They, too, 
according to Forcadel, had faced the unjust accusation that combining 
the cult of the law with the cult of fiction and poetry is almost 
tantamount to violating the legally established order.44  
 A brilliant jurist, Forcadel must have perceived better than anyone else 
that every attempt at ordering society suffers from its own passions, its 
own frailties, and its own “non-dits”. He found no better place to reveal 
them than on Cupid’s stage. He was also aware of the costs in terms of 
success among posterity of expressing such sceptic convictions aloud. 
His narcissitic fears became real through Papire Masson’s hagiography of 
Jacques Cujas. It included a truculent criticism of Cujas’ rival from 
Béziers. Consequently, Forcadel had been banned almost definitively 
from legal historical memory.  
 At least with regard to its vain hope for glory, Forcadel’s genius 
posthumously got a firm reason to believe in the tragic Greek proverb 
which, tellingly, preceded Cupid the Jurist: “hope without hope” (elpis aneu 
elpidos). Still, the most sane conclusion to be drawn from this proverb as 
well as from his enthralling novel, is that there is no hope that love and 
law will ever be seen to coexist peacefully. This is Forcadel’s ultimate 
advice.45
                                        
44 Forcadel (as in 1), p. 129: “Ac, ut ipsi loquuntur, iura sanctissima fabulis et carminibus 
permiscere, quasi violare. Et hoc est vetus accusationis caput, adversus quam aequitate 
atque innocentia pro disertissimo patrocinio muniemur.” 
45 See footnote 9. 
